Glenda B. Claborne
Socio 500b
Feb. 16, 1999
Joas, H. (1996). The Creativity of Action. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press.

What is the theory of the creativity of action?

The theory of the creativity of action is a conceptual reconstruction of the concepts of rationality and normativity of human action found in early theories of action. The theory is being developed in terms of an overarching concept of creativity which the theory posits to underlie all human action. It is being developed as a sociological theory to emphasize the creative dimension of human action and to account for the full spectrum of human action, which includes those actions that are hitherto covered by earlier theories of action as well as the residual categories of action generated by these theories.

Earlier theories of action took as their starting point either the rationality or normativity of action which relegated non-purposive, spontaneous, and aberrant actions to categories that are less than ideal or desirable. The theory of the creativity of action endeavors to do away with the Cartesian dualisms of the early theories of action by asserting a continuum of all human action that takes as its common thread the creative element in all human action.

The theory draws its concept of creativity primarily from the pragmatist and expressivist anthropological notions of the creative character of human action. The theory is derived broadly, however, from a reflective analysis of the intellectual history of the concepts involved in theories of action and of the notion of creativity in the works of authors analyzed in Parsons' The Structure of Social Action and in works that express 'metaphors' of creativity. Joas argues that, although Parsons' analyses of the works of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber were with regard to these works' convergence on a theory of action, the creative dimension of action was marginalized in Parsons' narrow framework of utilitarianism versus normativity in which only rational and normative actions were considered. Furthermore, Joas asserts that the authors considered by Parsons were not able to fully integrate their notions of creativity into their works.

Joas then looked at how the idea of creativity was integrated in the idea of expression in Herder's work and in the ideas of production and revolution in Marx's writings. However, Joas writes that none of these ideas or metaphors of creativity can give a broad definition of creativity that covers all three ways of relating to the world, namely; subjectively, materially and socially. There is therefore the danger that these ideas can be falsely generalized to all forms of human action to interpret all human actions as either expressive, productive or revolutionary when in fact each of them cover only at least one of the three ways of relating to the world.

There is also the concretist tendency, particularly in Marx's ideas of production and revolution, to attribute creativity to certain types of concrete actions. This leads to a devaluation of other types of action and to an extension of a typology of action beyond the bounds of its applicability. Joas sees a more profound grasp of creativity in the concepts of 'life' in the philosophy of life and of 'intelligence' in pragmatism in that these concepts do not equate creativity with one particular, concrete type of action.

How does the theory of the creativity of action overcome the problems of earlier theories of action?

Earlier theories of action defined action primarily in terms of rationality, which in the narrow utilitarian sense refers to the maximization of efficiency in goal achievement, or, in the pure Kantian sense refers to unconditional and universally binding moral obligations. Later, Habermas defined types of rationality as stages toward the full concept of communicative rationality. Joas mentions the following problems with taking these concepts of rationality as starting points in conceptualizing human action:

With the utilitarian concept of rationality, actions that are not goal-oriented are lumped together, for example, spontaneous emotional action and reflective moral action. With the Kantian concept, amoral self-interest is considered irrational. With Habermas typology of communicative rationality, the typology only allows us to delineate action along types of rationality.

Joas then posits that the true alternative to rational action as the starting point in understanding human action lies in the "reconstructive introduction of the concept of rational action. Reconstructive introduction is the process of shedding light on the tacit assumptions behind ideas of rational action." Joas lists the following tacit assumptions:

The problem, however, is that the above rational capacities are not always observed in everyday life, a fact which even the proponents of early theories of action concede. In the course of everyday human action, one is just as likely to observe actors showing a low degree of concentration on purposive action, a loss or a low level of body control, or a loss or abdication of autonomy as an individual as they show purposive, well-controlled and independent action. Joas argues that the problems of earlier theories of action can be overcome by an analysis of the tacit assumptions of theories of action in terms of the following:

A non-teleological interpretation of the intentionality of action rejects the means-ends schema ,which interprets human action as guided by set goals and advances through a chain of means and ends. Joas takes into account Parsons' effort to contradict the stimulus-response schema in behaviorism by integrating "the role played by conditions and means of action in situational, deterministic thought and the role played by ends and the values constitutive of such ends in idealistic approaches." To Joas, however, the question is not whether all action phenomena can be interpreted in a teleological means-ends schema. Rather, Joas asks whether the means-ends schema does not in fact prevent us from fully understanding the preconditions for goal-setting and goal-oriented actions in that the schema presents these conditions as given and self-evident.

Joas cites the work of Luhmann, who questioned the uncritical use of the means-ends schema to interpret human action in organized cooperation, to show that the set goals and plans of an organization or the orders, commands and instructions are not always the decisive factor in the organization and maintenance of organizational action. Joas also cites Dewey's critique of the means-ends schema to show that action does not necessarily occur under external or internal compulsions. Rather, Dewey emphasizes that goals arise from a creative interaction of means and ends in a situation. "Only when we recognize that certain means are available to us do we discover goals which had not occurred to us before."